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TO PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT on January 9, 2018 at 9:00 am, or as soon thereafter
the matter may be heard, in the Complex
4;

as

Civil Litigation Department of the above-titled court, located at

400 County Center, Redwood City, CA 94063, Defendant F acebook, Inc. (“Facebook”)
does move the Court, pursuant to California Code

of Civil Procedure

will

and hereby

section 425.16, to Strike-(Anti-

SLAPP Motion) Plaintiff Six4Three, LLC’s (“Six4Three”) Fourth Amended Complaint.
\DOOQONUI

This Special Motion to Strike is made on the ground that the Fourth Amended Complaint arises

from the exercise of the constitutional right of free speech in connection with an issue of public interest,
and Six4Three cannot show a probability
10

of success

on its claims against Facebook.

This motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the accompanying Memorandum

of Laura E. Miller,

of

11

Points and Authorities in Support thereof, the Declaration

12

this action, all matters of which judicial notice can be taken, and any further evidence or argument that

13

the Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

14

Dated: November 21, 2017

and the ﬁles and records in

DURIE TANGRI LLP

15

By:

16

LAURA E. MILLER

17

Attorneys for Defendant
Facebook, Inc.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
This case is an attack on Facebook’s free speech rights and should be stricken pursuant to the

U.)

anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code

§

425.16.

Facebook brings this motion because Plaintiff

Six4Three, LLC (“Six4Three”) is taking its ﬁfth shot at an ever-expanding set

claims turn on one decision, ‘which is absolutely protected:

of claims,

and all

of its

Facebook’s editorial decision to stop

publishing certain user-generated content via its Platform to third-party app developers.
Six4Three was a two-man company that developed one app: Pikinis.

Pikinis accessed and

\DOO\]O\

analyzed a user’s friends’ photos on Facebook to ﬁnd pictures

of women in bikinis. As reported in

the

Hufﬁngton Post, this “creepy” app was tested by frat boys. Declaration of Laura E. Miller in Support of
Gizmodo reported “This Creepy iPhone App Finds Pictures of

1o

Motion to Strike (“Miller Decl.”) Ex.

11

Your Facebook Friends in Bikinis.” Miller Decl. EX. 2. Unsurprisingly, Pikinis made little more than

12

$400 in sales. But when Facebook decided to stop publishing users’ friends’ photos via its Platform,

13

Six4Three sued. Now, Six4Three’s single investor is bankrolling this lawsuit and seeking a windfall of

14

$100M. Six4Three challenges Facebook’s decision regarding what third-party content it publishes to

15

developers, and seeks to force Facebook to publish all

1.

of its users’ friends’ photos to all

app developers.

16

The fatal ﬂaw is that Facebook has a right (and need) to make editorial decisions as to what third-

17

party content is available through its Platform. The Facebook Platform is a free service available to

18

millions of third-party app developers that lets them access certain F acebook user data and content via its

19

APIs, when authorized by a user. Facebook made—and needs to continue to make—editorial decisions

2o

about what third-party content is available through its Platform to protect its users’ experience. To that

21

end, on

22

elected to not publish via its Platform APls content that an app user’s friends had shared with the user on

23

Facebook.

24

(Pikinis is free to seek direct permission from its users’ friends to access and analyze their photos).

April 30, 2015, one year after it gave

of the pending

change, Facebook

As a result, Pikinis could no longer access friends’ photos via the Facebook Platform.

Six4Three’s claims,

25

app developers notice

all of which fault Facebook for deciding to de-publish friends’ photos and

26

other third-party eontent, fall squarely within the anti-SLAPP statute because each implicates

27

Facebook’s conduct in furtherance

28

Each

of

the eight causes

of its constitutional right to

of action

free speech on issues

of public

concern.

challenges Facebook’s editorial decisions about what third-party
1
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content to allow or not allow to be disseminated to third-party app developers through its Platform, and

Facebook’s public statements regarding those decisions.

position

as the

As Six4Three alleges, due to Facebook’s

largest social media company in the world, its determination

of what

user-generated

content to publish via its Platform to third-party app developers “greatly implicates the public interest.”

Six4Three cannot meet its burden to offer actual evidence demonstrating a probability of success
on the merits

47 U.S.C.

§

of its claims. First, Six4Three’s claims

are barred by the Communications Decency Act,

230 et seq. (“CDA”), as Six4Three seeks to hold Facebook, an interactive computer service,

\DOO\10\

liable

as the

publisher or speaker

of content provided by third-party

users. Second, Six4Three’s breach

of contract claim is based on a facially-implausible reading of a provision not even found in the operative
10

contract. Third, Six4Three’s Section 17200 theory is untethered to any antitrust law, as required under

11

controlling authority. Finally, Six4Three’s tort and fraud claims all fail on multiple additional grounds.

12

II..

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Facebook Platform is a free service that Facebook makes available to third parties that

13

14

register as Facebook developers. 4AC

15

other things, access certain third-party content that Facebook has decided to publish via its Platform,

16

subject to user consent. Id. This user-created content includes photos, videos, events, and news stories.

17

Id.

18

and web-based applications with enhanced user experiences. Id.

19

nothing for access to the user-created content that Facebook decides to publish through its Platform. Id.

20

111}

60—62.

1H]

1, 28.

The Facebook Platform allows developers to, among

By using the Facebook Platform and accessing this content, developers can build mobile
App developers like Six4Three pay

Six4Three tried to get rich by building an app that utilized the user-created content published

4AC

ﬂ

21

through the Facebook Platform.

22

December 2012, agreed to Facebook’s Statement

23

was given access to the content Facebook made available at the time (when authorized by a Facebook

24

user), which included Facebook users’ friends’ photos and users’ newsfeeds. Id.

25

that content, Six4Three developed Pikinis.

1,

25.

Six4Three set up

of Rights

a

Facebook developer account in

and Responsibilities (“SRR”), and in return

1111

87, 99—100. Using

26

Facebook announced on April 30, 2014 that it would update the Platform APIs on April 30, 2015

27

to de-publish certain third-party content, including content that an app user’s friends had shared with the

28

user, like a user’s friends’ photos or newsfeed. 4AC

11

118. Facebook implemented this change in

2
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April

2015 for all developers. Id.

11

152. Six4Three claims that Facebook’s decision to de—publish this content

through its Platform APIs caused Pikinis to stop working. Id.

11

141.

Six4Three ﬁled and served its Fourth Amended Complaint on November 1, 2017.

of Six4Three’s eight

alleged conduct by F acebook forms the basis for each

contract, violation

of Section

The same

of action: breach of

causes

17200, concealment, intentional and negligent misrepresentation,

intentional interference with contract, and intentional and negligent interference with prospective
economic relations.

For each claim, Six4Three alleges that it was harmed by Facebook’s editorial

\OOO\]O‘\

decision to de-publish certain categories

other content. As to each

of user-created

of the claims, Six4Three

content, including friends’ photos, newsfeed, and

seeks an injunction requiring F acebook to re-publish

10

this user-generated content via its Platform APIs. Id.

11

III.

11

92.

ARGUMENT
This Motion Is Timely.

12

A.

13

Under Section 425.16(f), an anti-SLAPP motion may be ﬁled “within 60 days of the service

of

of an

14

the complaint or, in the court’s discretion, at any later time upon terms

15

amended complaint resets the 60-day deadline to ﬁle. See, e.g., Lam v. Ngo, 91 Cal. App. 4th 832, 835

16

(2001) (“Because the Legislature has speciﬁed that the anti-SLAPP suit law

17

broadly, the provision in the law that a special motion to strike ‘may be ﬁled within 60 days

18

complaint’ includes amended

19

Signet Bank/Virginia, the First District Appellate Court held that an anti-SLAPP motion was timely

20

because

21

could have been ﬁled earlier and “nothing that implicated the anti-SLAPP law” was added in the

22

amendments.

23

Ivie, 193 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1115 (2011) (holding that an anti-SLAPP motion on the first amended

24

complaint was timely, even though it was ﬁled after 60 days of service of the original complaint, and the

25

amendments were unrelated to anti-SLAPP issues).

26

it was ﬁled within 60

as

well

days

as

it

deems proper.” Service

.

.

.

is to be construed

original complaints”) (internal citations omitted).

of service of the third

of the

In Yu

v.

amended complaint, even though the motion

103 Cal. App. 4th 298, 315 (2002); see also Country Side Villas Homeowners Ass ’n v.

The only case to the contrary that Facebook is aware of, Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v.

27

Morris Cerullo World Evangelism,

28

Packard Co.

v.

6 Cal. App. 5th 1207 (2016),

follows dicta in

a

footnote in Hewlett—

Oracle Corp, 239 Cal. App. 4th 1174 (2015). As that case that is currently before the
3
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California Supreme Court, it is no longer good authority. Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(e) (“Pending
review and ﬁling of the Supreme Court’s opinion

.

.

.

a

published opinion

of a Court of Appeal in

the

matter has no binding or precedential effect, and may be cited for potentially persuasive value only.”).

Furthermore, although the California Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed this issue, its prior
.

decisions support an inference that it views the 60-day deadline as resetting after service

complaint. In DuPont Merck Pharm. Co.
court to reconsider a summary denial
\OOOQO

v.

of an

amended

Superior Court, the Supreme Court directed an appellate

of a petition for a writ of mandate seeking to compel the trial court

to grant a special motion to strike. 78 Cal. App. 4th 562, 565 (2000), as modified (Jan. 25, 2000). The

summary denial was based on the fact that the special motion was untimely because the 60 days began
10

running from the original,

11

by asking the appellate court to reconsider, saw nothing wrong in considering an anti-SLAPP motion

12

directed against an amended complaint, even though more than 60 days had elapsed since the service

13

the original complaint. Lam, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 842.

distinct from the amended, complaint. In other words, the Supreme Court,

of

Six4Three ﬁled the Fourth Amended Complaint on November 1, 2017. Facebook brings this

14
15

as

motion on November 21, 2017, within the 60-day statutory time frame.1

Legal Standard for Special Motion to Strike.

16

B.

17

California favors summary resolution of First Amendment cases because of the special burden

18

they place on free speech. See, e.g., Good Gov ’t Grp. v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 672, 685 (1978).

19

Section 425.16 provides “a mechanism through which complaints that arise from the exercise

20

speech rights ‘can be evaluated at an early stage in the litigation process’ and resolved expeditiously.”

21

Simmons v. Allstate Ins. Co., 92 Cal. App. 4th 1068, 1073 (2001) (citation omitted). The statute was

22

amended in 1997 to mandate that it “shall be construed broadly” to achieve its ends.

23

Code

§

425 .16(a); Equilon Enterprises,

LLC v. Consumer

of free

Cal. Civ. Proc.

Cause, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 53, 60 (2002).

Section 425.16 involves a two-part, burden-shifting test. Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal. 4th 82, 88

24
25

26

Even if the Court determines that Facebook’s motion is untimely as to Six4Three’s causes of action that
were not amended with new allegations in the Fourth Amended Complaint, Facebook’s motion remains
timely as to Count III (concealment), Count VII (intentional interference with prospective economic
advantage), and Count VIII (negligent interference with prospective economic advantage).
1

27
28

4
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(2002). First, the defendant must show that the
furtherance

of the constitutional right of free

plaintiffs claims

arise from the defendant’s activities in

speech in connection with an issue

of public interest,

as

deﬁned by Section 425 .16(a). These activities include “any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise

of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free
issue or an issue
an onerous one.

of public interest.” Id.
A defendant

at

§

425.16(e)(4).

speech in connection with a public

“A defendant’s burden on the ﬁrst prong

is not

need only make a prima facie showing that plaintiff’s claims arise from

defendant’s constitutionally protected free speech or petition rights.”

0korie

v.

Los Angeles Uniﬁed

\000\]O\

School District, 14 Cal. App. 5th 574, 590 (2017), review ﬁled (Oct. 2, 2017) (citation omitted).
To determine whether

a

defendant has met its burden, the court focuses on the “defendant’s

10

activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability.” Navellier, 29 Cal. 4th at 92. Section 425.16

11

“plainly applies to any

12

Commc’ns, Inc., 221 Cal. App. 4th 398, 402 (2013) (ﬁnding breach

13

scope

14

plaintiff’s cause of action itself was based on

15

free speech.” Kronemyer v. Internet Movie Data Base, Inc., 150 Cal. App. 4th 941, 946 (2007) (citation

16

omitted); see also Ingels v. Westwood One Broad. Servs., Inc., 129 Cal. App. 4th 1050, 1064 (2005) (“a

17

court must consider the actual objective of the suit and grant the motion

18

with and burden the defendant’s exercise of his free speech and petition rights”) (citation omitted).

of action that

meets the statutory requirements.”

Hupp v. Freedom

of contract claim fell within the

of Section 425.16) (citation omitted). “In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical point

If the

19

cause

an act in furtherance

defendant meets its prima facie burden

is whether the

of the defendant’s right of petition or

of showing that

if the true

goal is to interfere

the claim is within the scope

of

plaintiff to show a probability of success on the merits of its

20

Section 425.16, then the burden shifts to the

21

claims. The plaintiff must “demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufﬁcient and supported by a

22

sufﬁcient prima facie showing of facts to sustain

23

plaintiff is credited.” Navellier, 29 Cal. 4th at

88—89

24

plaintiff cannot show a probability of prevailing

on a claim, the claim is stricken. Id. at 89.

a

favorable judgment

if the evidence

submitted by the

(internal quotations and citation omitted).

If the

Six4Three’s Claims Are Subject to a Special Motion to Strike.

25

C.

26

All of Six4Three’s claims

arise from Facebook’s exercise

of its

speech rights in connection with

of public interest: Facebook’s editorial decision to de-publish to certain categories of content

27

issues

28

created by its billions

of users that it previously published through

its Platform, and public statements

5
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regarding those decisions. Six4Three’s claims must be stricken pursuant to Section 425.16(e)(4).

Six4Three’s Claims Arise From Facebook’s Speech and Conduct in
Furtherance of the Exercise of Its First Amendment Rights.2

1.

of content

Facebook’s decision to de-publish certain categories
exercise

created by its users was an

of editorial discretion taken in furtherance of its constitutional right to free

speech, and each

of

Six4Three’s claims arises from that exercise of editorial discretion. Lawsuits, such as this one, that target
a

platform operator’s editorial discretion in the maintenance of its forum are indisputably “based on

\DOO\]O\

conduct in furtherance of free speech rights [on matters of public concern] and must withstand scrutiny
under Califomia’s anti-SLAPP statute.” Greater Los Angeles Agency on Deafness, Inc. v. Cable News
10

Network, Inc., 742 F.3d 414, 424—25 (9th Cir. 2014); Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 438

11

(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding decisions by search engines regarding which results to publish protected by

12

First Amendment).

The decision to de-publish content is afforded the exact same constitutional

decision to publish it in the ﬁrst place. See,

protection

as the

14

(“It

course, well established that the constitutional right

15

speak”) (citations omitted). And the method by which Facebook publishes or de-publishes content—

16

either through its APIs or on its website—cannot alter the conclusion that it is doing so in furtherance

17

the exercise

is,

of

of free

speech includes the right not to

of

Facebook’s Decision to De-Publish Content Is an Issue of Public Interest.

F acebook’s editorial decision to

19

Kronemyer, 150 Cal. App. 4th at 947

of its First Amendment rights.
2.

18

e. g.,

limit third-party developers’

of public interest. Although

access to Facebook’s user-created

the anti-SLAPP statute “does not deﬁne a ‘public issue’

2o

content is

21

or an ‘issue

22

construed broadly’ and found that ‘an issue

23

interested.” Maloney

24

1004 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Nygard, Inc. v. Uusi—Kerttula, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1027, 1042 (2008)); see

a

matter

of public interest[,]’ [c]ourts

v.

T3Media,

Inc,

have considered the statute’s explicit provision that

of public interest

.

.

.

it ‘shall

be

is any issue in which the public is

94 F. Supp. 3d 1128, 1134

(CD. Cal. 2015), aﬂ’d,

8-53

F.3d

25

26
2

27
28

For the reasons set forth here, Six4Three’s claims are also barred by the First Amendment because
Facebook’s editorial discretion regarding what user-created content to publish is constitutionally
protected free speech. The remedy sought by Six4Three—an injunction mandating that Facebook
publish certain content—would be compelled speech, in violation of Facebook’s First Amendment rights.
6
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also Rivera v. Am. Fed ’n

of State,

& Mun. Employees, AFL—CIO,

Cty.,

105 Cal.

App. 4th 913, 924 (2003)

(public issue includes “conduct that could directly affect a large number of people beyond the direct
L»)

participants”).
Six4Three does not and cannot dispute this point.

Six4Three itself alleges that the Facebook

Platform is utilized by hundreds of thousands of third-party software developers to improve the

functionality and user experience of their mobile and web-based applications.

Six4Three expressly

alleges that Facebook’s “decision to close access to the Graph API Data” affected “tens

of thousands of

companies” that had built their businesses on the Facebook Platform.

These “tens

\DOO\IO\

thousands”

of developers that “relied

on Facebook Platform for organic growt

10

hostage” by Facebook’s editorial decisions regarding which categories

11

provide through the Platform.

12

decisions regarding how it publishes the content provided by its users is

Id. ﬂ 279.

14

Because Six4Three’s claims fall within the scope

17

”

of

were allegedly “h[e]ld

user-generated content to

of concern to the public.

Six4Three Cannot Establish a Likelihood of Success on Its Claims.

D.

16

of

231.

11

Thus, according to Six4Three’s own theory, Facebook’s

13

15

4AC

Six4Three to show
1.

a

of Section

425 .16, the burden shifts to

probability of success on the merits. Navellier, 29 Cal. 4th at

88—89.

The Communications Decency Act Bars All of Six4Three’s Claims.

The CDA immunizes Facebook from liability.

Section 230

of the CDA

establishes a “broad

18

statutory immunity,” Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321—22 (11th Cir. 2006), which

19

“protects from liability any activity that can be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that

20

third parties seek to post online.” Barnes

21

amended (Sept. 28, 2009) (internal quotations and citation omitted). This protection includes decisions

22

to withdraw content: “lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise

23

traditional editorial functions—such

24

content—are barred.” Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added).

25

as

v. Yahoo!,

Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 2009), as

of a publisher’s

deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter

Under CDA Section 230, online platforms are protected from liability related to the selection and

26

removal of content created by third parties.

27

interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by

28

another information content provider.”

Section 230 states that “[n]o provider or user

47 U.S.C.

§

of

an

230(c)(1). An “information content provider” is

7
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“any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.” Id.

of claims that might

Section 230 creates broad immunity from an array

platform’s users. See id.

§

230(c)(3) (“[njo cause

of action

§

230(f)(3).

arise from content created by a

may be brought and no liability may be

imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section”) (emphasis added).

By its plain language, Section 230(c) “creates

a

federal immunity to any cause

would make service providers liable for information originating with

a

of action that

third-party user of the service

. .

.”

KOOO\]O\

Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. Under Section 230(c)(1), a defendant is entitled to immunity

provides an “interactive computer service,” (2) plaintiff’s claim treats the defendant

if (1) the defendant

as

the “publisher”

of

10

the content at issue, and (3) the content was “provided by another information content provider.” 47

11

U.S.C.

§

230(c)(1). Each prong is satisﬁed.

12

a.

13

The ﬁrst prong

Facebook Is an Interactive Computer Service Provider.

of

the CDA-immunity test is easily met: Facebook is a “provider”

of

an

14

“interactive computer service.” 47 U.S.C.

15

service”

16

computer access by multiple users to a computer server.” Id.

17

whether Facebook meets this deﬁnition has rightly concluded it does, including this Court. See, e.g.,

18

Cross v. Facebook, 14 Cal. App. 5th 190 (2017), review denied (Oct. 25, 2017); Caraccioli v. Facebook,

19

Inc., 167 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1066 (NB. Cal. 2016), aﬂ’d, No. 16-15610, 2017 WL 2445063 (9th Cir.

20

June 6, 2017) (holding that

21

Facebook); Sikhsfor Justice ”SFJ”, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2015)

22

(“Sikhs”), aﬂ’d sub nom. Sikhs for Justice, Inc.

23

Klayman

24

(quoting Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 801 (ND. Cal. 2011)); Young v. Facebook, Inc.,

25

No. 5:10-CV—03579-JF/PVT, 2010 WL 4269304, at *5 (ND. Cal. Oct. 25, 2010) (same); Finkel

26

Facebook, Inc., No. 102578-09, 2009 WL 3240365 (N.Y. Sup. Sept. 15, 2009).

as

v.

§

230(c)(1). The CDA broadly deﬁnes “interactive computer

“any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables
§

230(t)(2).

Every court to consider

“immunity bestowed on interactive computers service providers” applies to

v.

Facebook, Inc., 697 F. App’x 526 (9th Cir. 2017);

Zuckerberg, 910 F. Supp. 2d 314, 318 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d, 753 F.3d 1354 (DC. Cir. 2014)

27
28
8
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v.

/“\

Six4Three’s Claims Seek to Hold Facebook Liable for the Exercise of a
Publisher’s Traditional Editorial Functions.

b.

The second prong

certain categories
a

z/\

of the CDA-immunity test

also is met: Facebook’s decisions to de-publish

of user-generated content previously published through

publisher’s decision.

Deciding what content to make available is

a

its Platform are unequivocally

traditional publisher function.

“[R]emoving content is something publishers do, and to impose liability on the basis of such conduct
necessarily involves treating the liable party as a publisher.” Sikhs, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1095 (quoting
KOOO\]O\

Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1103); id. at 1094 (“publication involves reviewing, editing, and deciding whether to

publish or to withdraw from publication third-party content” (quoting Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102)); see

of publishing

10

also Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“the very essence

11

making the decision whether to print or retract a given piece of content”). Section 230(c)(1) bars any and

12

all claims “relating to the monitoring, screening, and deletion of content from [a covered service’s]

13

network—actions quintessentially related to

14

465, 471 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & C0., Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986

15

(10th Cir. 2000) (Section 230 “forbid[s] the imposition of publisher liability on

16

exercise

of its editorial

of the

publisher’s role.” Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d

a

service provider for the

and self-regulatory functions”).

In determining whether

17

a

is

a

theory

of liability treats a defendant as a publisher, “what matters

is not

of action inherently requires

the court to

of content provided to another.”3 Barnes,

570 F.3d at

of action,” but rather “whether the

18

the name

19

treat the defendant as the ‘publisher or speaker’

20

1101.

21

certain categories

22

“publisher,” for exercising its publisher functions of limiting the dissemination of user-created content.

23

F acebook’s decision—“whether to print or retract a given piece

24

of publishing.” Klayman,

cause

cause

Because Six4Three’s claims rely on allegations that Facebook inappropriately de-published

of user-generated content, it impermissibly

seeks to impose

liability on Facebook,

of content”—goes

as a

to “the very essence

753 F.3d at 1359 (emphasis added); see also Sikhs, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1095—

25

26
27
28

3

Courts have extended CDA immunity to all of Six4Three’s claims. See, e. g., Cross, 14 Cal. App. 5th at
206 (ﬁnding CDA immunity as to claims for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and
negligent interference); Caraccioli, 167 F. Supp. 3d at 1066 (ﬁnding CDA immunity as to a Section
17200 claim); Jurin v. Google Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1122—23 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (ﬁnding CDA
immunity for interference with contract and prospective economic relations and fraud).
9
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96. Courts have invoked Section 230(c)(1) to reject claims against F acebook for removing content from

its platform, Sikhs, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1094—96, and against YouTube for taking down the plaintiffs’
videos, Lancaster v. Alphabet Inc., No. 15-CV-05299-HSG, 2016 WL 3648608, at *2—3 (N.D. Cal. July
8, 2016).

That Facebook’s editorial decision not to publish certain user content was implemented

through its APIs, rather than removingithe content from its website, is irrelevant. The situation is no

different than

a newspaper

publisher choosing to include different content in its paper version as

compared to its online version. Here, Facebook is exercising the core publishing function

of deciding to

\OOO\10\

remove content, and the mechanism by which Facebook chooses to implement that decision has no
bearing on the CDA analysis.

Finally, Six4Three’s baseless allegations

10

to Facebook’s intent are irrelevant. Even

as

if there

of Facebook’s concerns about how developers like Six4Three were

11

were any doubt about the legitimacy

12

utilizing the content Facebook published at the time (which there should not be,

13

described Pikinis as “creepy”,

14

requirement and applies regardless

15

1095 (ﬁnding discrimination claim precluded even where allegations were that conduct “was motivated

16

solely by unlawful discrimination”).

17

c.

18

The third prong

Miller Decl. Exs.

1

as

numerous websites

& 2), CDA Section 230(c)(1)

has no good faith

of defendants’ alleged motive.

See, e.g., Sikhs, 144 F. Supp. 3d at

The Content Was Provided by Someone Other Than Facebook.

of the CDA-immunity test

is met: the content that Six4Three claims Facebook

4AC

(“By ‘content’

19

wrongfully de-published was created and posted by Facebook users.

20

we mean anything

21

providers” of the content at issue.

22

a

23

CDA immunity) (citation omitted). All three prongs of the CDA-immunity test are met, and it bars all of

.

. .

See, e.g.,

11

190

users post on Facebook”). Thus, Facebook’s users are the “information content
See, e.g., Sikhs, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1093—94

(ﬁnding that the creator of

Facebook page that Facebook allegedly blocked was the “information content provider” for purposes

of

V

24
25

26

SiX4Three’s claims.
2.

Six4Three Cannot Show a Likelihood of Success on Its Contract Claim.

California adheres to “the objective theory of contracts,” under which it is the objective intent,

of the contract, that controls interpretation.

as

Founding Members of the

27

evidenced by the words

28

Newport Beach Country Club v.7Newp0rt Beach Country Club, Inc., 109 Cal. App. 4th 944, 956 (2003)
10
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(citation omitted); see also Cal. Civ. Code

of the parties

OO\]O\UI-P-UJN

1639 (“When a contract is reduced to writing, the intention

is to be ascertained from the writing alone,

an interpretation as

effect,

§

will

if possible[.]”). “A contract must receive such

make it lawful, operative, deﬁnite, reasonable, and capable

if it can be done without violating the intention of the parties.”

cannot show a likelihood

of success

on its breach

of being carried into

Cal. Civ. Code

1643. Six4Three

§

of contract claim for at least two reasons.

First, Six4Three’s breach of contract claim is based on its allegation that Facebook breached the
provision of the December 2012

SR in which Facebook agreed to give Six4Three “all rights necessary

to use the code, APIs, data, and tools you receive from us.” 4AC
\D

11

190. The ﬁmdamental problem is

that the operative SRR does not include this provision. Miller Decl. Ex. 3 at Exhibit B. That contract

for its breach claim.

10

does not include and is not alleged to include the provision that Six4Three relies on

11

Id. To be sure, earlier versions of the

12

rights necessary to use the code, APIs, data, and tools you receive from us.” See,

13

9.2.8. But the contract was amended to remove that provision prior to the alleged breach in

14

Id. at Exhibit B. And Six4Three accepted the amendments. See, e.g., id. at Exhibit A

15

fatal to Six4Three’s breach
Second, even

16

SR include the provision that Facebook will give developers “all
e. g.,

id. at Exhibit

§

A

§

April 2015.

14.3. This is

of contract claim.

if the Court were to ﬁnd that the earlier, non-operative version of the SR controls
facially-invalid interpretation of the relevant clause

17

Six4Three’s claim, Six4Three’s claim is based on

18

in the earlier SRR. The plain language

19

legal rights necessary for developers to use the content Facebook publishes to developers, but only to the

2o

extent a developer receives such content from Facebook. 4AC

21

types

22

use that content. Facebook never agreed to provide

of the

a

clause makes clear that Facebook agreed to provide the

of content through the Facebook Platform, it

1[

190. When Facebook publishes certain

ensures that developers have the necessary rights to

all of its “code, APIs,

data, and tools” in perpetuity.

Any such interpretation would be inconsistent with the clear and explicit language of the
24
25

SR and the

objective intent of the parties.

In addition to being contrary to the plain language of the provision, Six4Three’s implicit

SR uses the phrase “all rights necessary”

26

interpretation is also at odds with how the

27

of the SR. For example, in a mirrored provision, Six4Three

28

necessary to enable [Pikinis] to work with Facebook, including the right to incorporate content and

in other provisions

agreed to provide Facebook with

1 1
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“all rights

information you provide to us into streams, timelines, and user action stories.” Miller Ex.
§

9.15. Just as F acebook did not agree always to provide all

3

at Exhibit

A

of its data to Six4Three, Six4Three similarly

did not agree to provide all of its “content and information” to Facebook forever. Rather, both parties
4;

agreed to give the other the legal rights necessary to use the information actually provided to the other.

Six4Three’s interpretation, that Facebook was obligated to continue to publish this content via its

Platform to Six4Three and hundreds of thousands of other developers for free forever, is inconsistent
\OOONONUI

with the objective intent evidenced by the words of the contract, is objectively unreasonable, and would
render the contract indeﬁnite and incapable

of being carried into effect. See Cal. Civ.

§

1643.

Six4Three Cannot Show a Likelihood of Success on Its Section 17200 Claim.

3.

Unlawful Prong. Six4Three does not and cannot state

10

Code

a

claim under the “unlawful” prong of

11

Section 17200. “By proscribing ‘any unlawful’ business practice, section 17200 ‘borrows’ violations

12

other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently

13

actionable.” Belton v. Comcast Cable Holdings, LLC, 151 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1233 (2007) (citation

14

omitted).

15

Facebook’s alleged conduct was “unlawful.” 4AC

16

speciﬁc law allegedly violated by F acebook, it has failed to state a claim under the unlawful prong. See,

17

e.g., Khoury v. Maly’s

18

“complaint identiﬁes no particular section of the statutory scheme which was violated and fails to

19

describe with any reasonable particularity the facts supporting violation”).

Six4Three does not allege that Facebook violated any other law; it merely asserts that

Unfair Prong.

20

of California, Inc.,

1]

183. Because Six4Three has failed to identify any

14 Cal. App. 4th 612, 619 (1993) (sustaining demurrer where

Six4Three’s complaint that Facebook’s alleged conduct was “unfair” is

claim under the Unfair Competition Law. In a case involving alleged competitors

21

insufﬁcient to allege

22

and competition, “the word ‘unfair’

23

law, or violates the policy or spirit

24

as a

25

Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. C0., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 187 (1999).

26

of

a

. . .

means conduct that threatens an incipient violation

of one of those laws

of an antitrust

because its effects are comparable to or the same

violation of the law, or otherwise signiﬁcantly threatens or harms competition.”

Cel—Tech

For over two years, Six4Three’s Section 17200 claim was based on a theory of unilateral

27

monopoly. According to Six4Three, Facebook engaged in

28

that it could “monopolize[] for itself the ability to create applications capable of searching or sorting

a scheme

12
SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE PURSUANT TO C.C.P.
CASE NO. CIV 533328

§

to restrict access to its user data so

425.16 (ANTI-SLAPP)/

/~«.

KN
.

photos.” Miller Decl. Ex. 4 (SAC)

11

116.

But to avoid federal jurisdiction, Six4Three unequivocally

disavowed its monopoly antitrust theory earlier this year. So now Six4Three advances its Section 17200

claim by transforming it into one of an allegedly illegal “oligopoly.” 4AC

1H]

4, 19, 85, 165, 168, 177.

But Six4Three does‘not and cannot allege facts to support its claim.

At

best,

it alleges that

Facebook entered into agreements with some third-party developers that gave those developers access to

certain categories of user-created content, but did not enter into such an agreement with Six4Three. See,

if this

e.g., id. ﬂ 168.

Even

California law.

See, e.g.,

were true, a refusal to deal is not a cognizable antitrust violation under

\OOO\]O\

modiﬁed on denial

Dimidowich

of reh’g,

v.

Bell & Howell, 803 F.2d 1473, 1478 (9th Cir. 1986), opinion

810 F.2d 1517 (9th Cir. 1987)

(“A manufacturer may

choose those with

10

whom it wishes to deal and unilaterally may refuse to deal with a distributor or customer for business

11

reasons without running afoul

of the antitrust laws.”) (citation omitted).

12

To the extent that Six4Three alleges that Facebook entered into prohibited tying arrangements

13

with third parties—a claim not explicitly made in Six4Three’s complaint—that. also fails. “A tying

14

arrangement under antitrust laws exists when a party agrees to sell one product (the tying product) on the

15

condition that the buyer also purchases a different product (the tied product), thereby curbing competition

16

in the sale of the tied product.” Belton, 151 Cal. App. 4th at 1234 (quoting Freeman

17

of Realtors,

18

harm to competition in the alleged tied product market, not the alleged tying product market.

Diego Ass ’11

with unlawful tying arrangements is

The closest that Six4Three comes to alleging a tying arrangement prohibited by the Cartwright

19

20

77 Cal. App. 4th 171, 183—94 (1999)). The concern

v. San

Act is this conclusory allegation:
Facebook and certain of its executives [] combined and conspired with other large
companies to oligopolize speciﬁc vertical markets by providing unequal access to the
Social Graph in exchange for these companies providing unrelated advertising payments
or other in-kind consideration to the extreme detriment of all other market participants.

21

22
23

if

Facebook had conditioned access to its user—created content on “unrelated

24

4AC

25

advertising” payments, this does not state an antitrust tying claim. Here, the “tying product” is allegedly

26

the unequal access to the user-generated content, and the “tied product” is “unrelated advertising

27

payments or other in-kind consideration” that other companies, but not Six4Three, allegedly paid

28

Facebook to get “unequal” access to user-created content. But Six4Three does not and cannot claim that

1[

168.

Even

13
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Facebook’s alleged conduct harmed competition in the alleged tied product market, which is the

“advertising” market. See Belton,
competition, the mere practice

151 Cal.

App. 4th at 1240 (“In the absence of some restraint upon

of packaging

services together is not inherently anticompetitive or

harmful to consumers”) (citations omitted). This is fatal to Six4Three’s claim.

Finally, Six4Three has not pled that the alleged conduct “violates the policy or spirit” of any
antitrust law. “[A]ny ﬁnding of unfairness to competitors under section 17200 [must] be tethered to
some legislatively declared policy

or proof of some actual or threatened impact on competition.”

Tech, 20 Cal. 4th at 186—87 (emphasis added).

Cel—

But Six4Three has not identiﬁed any “legislatively

declared policy” Facebook violated, nor has it alleged any actual or threatened impact on competition.4
4.

10

Six4Three Cannot Show a Likelihood of Success on Its Fraud Claims.

11

Six4Three cannot show a likelihood of success on its negligent and intentional misrepresentation

12

claims, because its two principals did not view or receive the alleged misrepresentations identiﬁed in the

13

Fourth Amended Complaint, let alone rely upon them.5

14

misrepresentations that supposedly induced it to register as a developer in 2012 include (1) statements

15

made by Facebook at the launch

16

statements made by Facebook at the launch

Six4Three claims that the alleged

of the Facebook Platform in 2007,

see, e.g.,

of Graph API in 2010, see, e. g., id.

4AC

11‘”

1111

29—42, and (2)

64—72.

Six4Three’s two principals conﬁrmed in sworn deposition testimony that they did not review the

17

of litigation. Six4Three’s founder and managing member, Ted

18

statements at issue before the anticipation

19

Kramer, testified that he was not aware of any presentations given during Facebook’s developer

20

conferences before January 2015—well after Six4Three contemplated bringing this lawsuit—and did not

21

recall reviewing any documents on the F acebook developers website before then. Miller Decl. Ex.

22

232:23—23329, 23423—25.

23

exception

5 at

Tim Gildea, Six4Three’s other member, testiﬁed that, with the possible

of parts of Mr. Zuckerberg’s 2014

F8 speech, he had not seen any presentations.

Miller Decl.

24
25
4

Six4Three does not allege the fraud prong in its Section 17200 claim.

A

business practice is

26

“fraudulent” within the meaning of Section 17200 if “members of the public are likely to be deceived.”
In re Ins. Installment Fee Cases, 211 Cal. App. 4th 1395, 1416 (2012). Six4Three makes no such

27

allegation in the Fourth Amended Complaint.
5
In addition, Six4Three cannot show a likelihood of success on its concealment claims for the reasons
set forth in Facebook’s Demurrer to Six4Three’s Fourth Amended Complaint, incorporated herein.

28
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1/

Ex. 6 at 1162—10. Six4Three has not produced any documents or evidence showing that Six4Three was
aware

of these public

of its principals ever

statements. Six4Three has conﬁrmed, under oath, that neither

saw the alleged misrepresentations, so Six4Three could not have relied upon them.

Six4Three Cannot Show a Likelihood of Success on Its Interference Claims.6

5.

4;

For an intentional interference with contract claim, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had
\]O\U\

knowledge

of

the contract and took intentional steps designed to induce a breach or disrupt the

contractual relationship.

Quelimane Co. v. Steward Title Guar. Co., 19 Cal. 4th 26, 55 (1998), as
Six4Three claims that Facebook interfered with Six4Three’s license

modiﬁed (Sept. 23, 1998).

agreements with its users by de-publishing certain categories
10

app used to function, including friends’ photos.

11

announced this decision on

12

App Store.

13

agreements when it announced its policy change. And Six4Three was in fact aware

14

Platform. as early as May 2014, but chose to go ahead and enter into agreements with its users in the

15

summer

16

interference with contract claim in the face

17

IV.

See

4AC

1111

267—271.

The problem is that Facebook

April 30, 2014, well before Pikinis was even available for

Miller-Decl. Exs.

of 2014 anyway.

See

7

&

8.

Facebook could not have known

Miller Decl. Ex.

9.

sale on the iOS

of Six4Three’s future
of the

changes to the

Six4Three cannot prevail on its intentional

of this undisputed evidence.

FACEBOOK SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS.
Facebook requests an order awarding its reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

18

“[A] prevailing

19

defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs.”

20

CiV. Proc. Code

21

SLAPP defendant who brings

22

Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1131 (2001).

23

V.

:5

§

425.16(c).

The California Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean that “any
a

successful motion to strike is entitled to mandatory attorney fees.”

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Facebook requests that Six4Three’s Fourth Amended Complaint be

24
'

of user-generated content that the Pikinis

dismissed with prejudice, and that Facebook be awarded its attomey’s fees and costs.

26

27
28

6

Six4Three also cannot show a likelihood of success on its intentional and negligent interference with
prospective economic relations claims for the reasons set forth in Facebook’s Demurrer to Six4Three’s
Fourth Amended Complaint, incorporated herein.
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DURIE TANGRI LLP

Dated: November 21, 2017

By:
45-9l

LAURA E. MILLER
Attorneys for Defendant
Facebook. Inc.
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PROOF OF SERVICE

I am a citizen of the United
Francisco County, State

States and resident

of the

State

of California. I am employed in

of California, in the ofﬁce of a member of the bar of this Court,

direction the service was made. I am over the age of eighteen years, and not

My business address is 217 Leidesdorff Street,
On November 21, 2017,

lg
ll
12
13

14

[15
16

at whose

party to the within action.

CA 94111.

I served the following documents in the manner described below:

NOTICE OF MOTION AND SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE AND FOR
ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO C.C.P. § 425.16 (ANTI-SLAPP);
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT

\OOO\IC\

10

San Francisco,

a

BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE: By electronically mailing a true

and correct copy through
Durie Tangri’s electronic mail system from jcotton@durietangri.com to the email
addresses set forth below.

On the following part(ies) in this action:

Basil P. Fthenakis
CRITERION LAW
2225 E. Bayshore Road, Suite 200
Palo Alto, CA 94303
Telephone: 650-352-8400
Facsimile: 650-352-8408
bpf@criterionlaw.com

David

S.

Godkin

James Kruzer
17
18
19

BIRNBAUM & GODKIN, LLP
280 Summer Street
Boston, MA 02210
Telephone: 617-307-6100
godkin@bimbaumgodkin.com
kruzer@bimbaumgodkin.com

20
21

22

San

Attorneys for Plaintiff
Six4 Three, LLC

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United

States

of America that the

foregoing is true and correct. Executed on November 21, 2017, at San Francisco, California.
24
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,
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26

Janelle Cotton
27
28
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